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RECENT CASES
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING SEARCH OR
SEIZURE - WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND POLICE DISCRETION - Defend-
ant, an armed robber, entered the premises of a cab company,
took $363 and ran. Two cab drivers followed defendant until he
entered his home. The cab drivers notified the company dispatcher
by radio that the man was a Negro about five-feet, eight inches
tall, wearing a light cap and dark jacket and that he had entered
a house on Cocoa Lane. The information was relayed to police
who converged on the house. Defendant's wife admitted the of-
ficers with no objection. One officer found clothing in the wash-
ing machine which matched the description before he knew that
a weapon, and the defendant, had been discovered in another part
of the house. The officers did not have a search warrant. The
Supreme Court of the United States, reversing the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, held that even though the clothing was
"mere evidence" and had "evidential value only," it was subject
to seizure and was admissible in the prosectuion of the defendant.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Most significant is the Court's reasoning which justified the
officers entering the home without a warrant: "The Fourth Amend-
ment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an
investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the
lives of other."1
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
This part of the Court's decision does not seem to be totally rec-
oncilable with the Fourth Amendment or its precedent interpreta-
tion. The justification for allowing the ,officers to enter without
1. Warden v. Hayden, 887 U.S. 294. 298-9 (1967).
2. .E. Omm, amend. IV.
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a warrant, although reasonable in some circumstances, may have
the end result of opening the doors of justice wide enough to allow
police officers to literally fabricate stories on the pretense of a
reasonable belief that their lives or the lives of others are in
danger and hence violate the sanctity of a man's home. The Court
is fostering, to an important degree, "guilt by suspicion".
The courts of this country have previously championed the pro-
tection of the right of privacy with the corresponding sanctity of
the home. Searches have been deemed illegal even where such
searches were in hot pursuit,s where the police officers observed
the illegal act,4 and where the officers had reliable information
to act upon.5 However, in State v. Hoyt,6 an entry without a
warrant was justified. There the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
said: "Upon observing a body lying on the floor it was [the
officers'] duty to enter the home in light of the report that they
had previously received. ' 7 The important factor was the previous
report of the shooting together with the observation of the body
through a window by the officers. But Johnson v. United States8
held that a search was illegal where officers, detecting the odor
of burning opium from a hotel room, entered without a warrant.
There the Supreme Court of the United States noted:
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is
also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a
society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and
freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or govern-
ment enforcement agent. 9
The decision in the instant case seems to eliminate this rule.
The right of privacy may now reasonably yield to police officials.
In the history of search and seizure law, the courts have con-
stantly dealt with the issues of reasonableness and with the con-
cept of an emergency. In McDonald v. United States,0 for ex-
ample, police, suspecting defendant of operating an illegal lottery,
kept the defendant under surveillance for two months. Thinking
that they detected from the outside the sound of an adding machine
and observing defendants operating a lottery through a transom,
they forced their way, without a warrant, into the rooming house
8. Hair v. United Statx 289 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
4. Keiningham v. United States, 287 F.2d 126, (D.C. Mr. 1960).
5. Miller v. United State, 257 U.S. 801 (1958).
6. 21 WIB.2d 284, 124 N.W.2d 47 (1962).
7. 14. at 64.
8. 888 U.S. 10 (1948).
9. Id. at 14.
10. 885 U.S. 451 (1948).
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and into the room of defendants. Demanding and obtaining en-
trance, officers arrested defendants and seized papers and other
items. The conviction was reversed. The Court's concept of an
emergency is most noteworthy: "This is not a case where officers,
passing by on the street, hear a shot and a cry for help and demand
entrance in the name of the law." '11 The Court further stated:
The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust
to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime
and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and
history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be
trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to
pass on the desires of the police before they violate the
privacy of the home. We cannot be true to that constitutional
requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant
without a showing by those who seek exemption from the
constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation
made the course imperative.
2
Can we generalize on what are the "exigencies of the situ-
ation"? The McDonald court gave its impression of an emergency
which is rather an extreme example. Quaere, have the courts given
us anything more to go on? Most recently, Minnesota's and Iowa'"
have concluded that in effect the ultimate test of search and
seizure is whether it is reasonable under the facts of each case.
The courts have not set out an actual test for determining the
justification for a warrantless search. We are left with only the
vague concepts of reasonableness and circumstances and exigen-
cies of the situation. We have tests for insanity, we have tests
for obscenity, we have the Miranda doctrine which is a test, and
we have tests of one sort or another in all areas of the law, but
we do not have a test of certainty for the protection of the sanc-
tity of the home. We are only given vague terms for interpretation
and decision.
By the use of a hypothetical, we can see where the recent
decision might lead us. X is suspected by the police of being
involved in some criminal activity. Police enter the home of X
for the purpose of a search. X in fact is not home. The police
might justify their entry on the grounds that they thought they
saw a person in the window with a gun and they "reasonably be-
lieved that their lives or the lives of others might be in danger."
It makes no difference whether they find anything. The search is
still legal and if they do find some evidence which will lead to
11. Id. at 454.
12. Id. at 455-56.
18. State v. Kotka, 152 N.W.2d 445 (Minn. 1967).
14. State v. Collins, 152 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1967).
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the arrest of X, the evidence will be admitted. Our homes may
now be invaded upon the fabrication or imaginations of law en-
forcement officers. The Supreme Court did not, or may not, have
weighed the values of police expediency versus privacy and sanc-
tity of the home. In some circumstances, obviously, the decision
may save lives or property. But in others, it may destroy val-
uable personal rights. There must be a middle ground. "Under
our system, suspicion is not enough for an officer to lay hands on
a citizen. It is better, so the Fourth Amendment teaches, that




FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE - NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
DILIGENCE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN NEW TRIAL-The plain-
tiff, an employee of the defendant railroad company, and his road
crew were to assist another crew rerail a locomotive. The engine
was surrounded by snow which had become solidly packed, creat-
ing a hazardous condition. In the course of the work, plaintiff
slipped and fell, sustaining personal injuries. In an action against
the railroad, the trial court entered a verdict for the defendant.
Several months after the judgment, on the grounds of newly dis-
covered evidence, plaintiff moved for a new trial under Rule 60 (b)
(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The alleged
newly discovered evidence was the testimony of a railroad em-
ployee stating that his crew was the first to arrive at the derail-
ment. The newly discovered evidence revealed that before the
plaintiff arrived blow torches had been used around the derailed
engine, causing a considerable amount of the snow to melt. Due
to the extremely cold temperature, the melted snow immediately
refroze and created the icy surface on which the plaintiff had
slipped and sustained his injuries.
The alleged newly discovered evidence was offered after a local
railroad employee's bulletin reported that the plaintiff had lost
his suit against the railroad. After reading of the result, a rail-
road employee offered testimony as to his knowledge of the cir-
cumstances surrounding plaintiff's injuries. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, with one judge dissenting, held
that the plaintiff knew or should have known that another railroad
employee witnessed his fall and that failure to question this witness
15. Henry v. Unlted States, 861 U.6. 98 (1959).
